Introduction
As part of the broader quantum cognition program a number of researchers have considered whether there is evidence for violation of contextual inequalities in psychology (e.g., Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013) , Asano, Hashimoto, Khrennikov, Ohya, and Tanaka (2014) , Bruza, Kitto, Ramm, and Sitbon (2015) , Bruza, Wang, and Busemeyer (2015) ).
Such inequalities are derived on the assumption that there exist hidden joint preference or probability states for the psychological observables being measured. This is, loosely, equivalent to assuming that judgment processes giving rise to choices between different options operate independently, which is an important constraint on the processes underlying human decision making.
One complicating factor is that it is hard to rule out the possibility of direct influence between measurements, which can mimic the effect of true contextuality. In other words, contextuality means the outcome of a judgment about observable A can depend on what else is being measured, but that can also occur if the outcome of the other measurements directly influence A.
The absence of such direct influences must be justified or explicitly tested in any particular application. In physics such influences can sometimes be ruled out by reference to some physical principle, but nothing equivalent in psychology can be used to rule out direct influences a priori. The challenge of quantifying exactly when violations of contextual inequalities can be accounted for by direct influences, and when they can only be explained by genuine contextuality, was taken up by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) who derived modified inequalities which, they claim, allow the identification of true contextuality not explainable by signalling (We will explain the distinction between direct influence and signalling below.).
In a series of papers Dzhafarov and collaborators reanalyzed existing experimental claims of contextuality in psychology and concluded they could all be explained by direct influences , Dzhafarov, Kujala, Cervantes, Zhang, and Jones (2016) ). However in an elegant paper Cervantes and Dzhafarov (2018) presented an experiment which did satisfy their modified contextual inequality, and in a recent paper Basieva et al. (2019) followed this up with series of experiments, the majority of which produced data demonstrating genuine contextuality according to Dzhafarov and Kujala's modified inequalities.
In this comment we explain why we do not believe that the results presented by Basieva et al. (2019) provide compelling evidence for contextuality in human decision making. We only consider in detail the form of experiment conducted by Basieva et al. (2019) and Cervantes and Dzhafarov (2018) , but we use the insight gained to question whether contextuality could ever be observable in human decision making.
Outline of Basieva et al. (2019) Consider one of the experiments in Basieva et al. (2019) ; "Alice wishes to order a two-course meal. For each course she can choose a high-calorie option (indicated by H) or a low-calorie option (indicated by L). Alice does not want both courses to be high-calorie nor does she want both of them to be low-calorie."
Each participant was given two out of three courses (Starter, Main, Dessert) to choose from. Clearly participants should select options so that while the calorie content of, eg, the starter is undetermined, it is anti-correlated with the calo-rie content of the main (indeed this restriction was forced on participants in the experiment.) We can easily see why Basieva et al. (2019) expect to see evidence of contextuality -the underlying probability distribution for all three courses needs to have three binary anti-correlated variables, which is impossible. In other words, the calorie content of at least two of the dishes has to match, since there are three courses and only two calorie options, but then one cannot have the three choices anti-correlating.
The specific inequality Basieva et al. (2019) are testing for the experiment we outlined above is given by,
(1) Here E[·] denotes an expectation value, and R m n refers to the random variable R n , taking values ±1, measured in the context m. For example context 1 might be the condition where participants were asked to choose options for Starter and Main. This is a special case of Dzhafarov and Kujala's (2015) more general inequalities, and if it is satisfied Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) would claim genuine contextuality. What Basieva et al. (2019) did was to show this inequality was satisfied by data collected in a number of different experiments which were variants of the one outlined above.
However it is intuitively obvious how participants could solve the problem set by Basieva et al. (2019) ; given two courses to select, eg starter and main, choose the calorie content of the first one randomly, then make the opposite choice for the second course. This complies with the instructions and is 'non-contextual' in a colloquial sense, since it makes no reference to measurement contexts. However it does not sit well with the idea of a pre-existing preference, since one of the judgments is made deterministically based on the other, with no reference to existing preferences. We therefore need to apply a more precise measure of contextuality. Also, as described, this strategy has the feature that it will tend to produce equal preferences for each course, which is not what was observed in Basieva et al. (2019) . So we need to establish that this heuristic can generalise to cases where the preferences are not equal.
A Non-Contextual Account
To be precise, we take non-contextuality to be defined as follows: a given set of data possesses a non-contextual model if and only if there exists a joint probability distribution matching the set of marginal probabilities characterizing the data. Contextuality is thus defined to be the absence of such a distribution. This definition of contextuality is essentially the same as that frequently employed both in physics (see for example Abramsky and Brandenburger (2011) ) and in cognitive models in psychology (see for example, Oaksford and Chater (2007) ). However, different definitions are sometimes employed and in particular Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) proposed a more restricted definition of non-contextuality (which thus implies a weaker notion of contextuality), and we will return to this below.
Let us begin with our idealized version of the experiment: assume participants solve the problem by choosing the calorie content of the first course randomly, then making the opposite choice for the second course. The expectation value of any of the variables therefore equals zero, regardless of the context in which it is measured. That means,
so Eq. (1) is satisfied and Dzhafarov and Kujala would presumably claim genuine contextuality in this case. However it is possible to write down a probability distribution on the variables R
, which has these correlations and expectation values; We note an interesting property of this probability distribution, which is that it clearly factorises as; The reason, in terms of a process account, is that R 3 1 is basically set by R 3 3 , which is an independent random variable. So the effect of the direct influence is to remove correlations between the same variable in different contexts.
This idealisation is interesting, because the fact the expectation values of all individual variables are all zero means the modified contextual inequality of Dzhafarov and Kujala's (2015) reduces to the one in the absence of signalling. In other words, although our account of this experiment involves direct influence between variables measured in the same context, the framework of Dzhafarov and Kujala regards this as being a scenario with no signalling. This suggests the origin of the discrepancy between the claims in Cervantes and Dzhafarov (2018) and Basieva et al. (2019) and our demonstration of non-contextuality lies in the definition of signalling used by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) . We will explore this further below.
Our idealisation of the experiments in Basieva et al. (2019) is informative, but the results they reported had nonzero expectation values for R 1 1 , R 2 2 and R 3 3 . We can modify our account to deal with this by taking the joint probability to have the same form as Eq. (4) We have therefore shown by explicitly constructing a joint probability distribution that the experimental results reported in Basieva et al. (2019) can be accounted for by a noncontextual model which includes direct influences.
Different Notions of Signalling and Contextuality
The roots of our disagreement with Basieva et al. (2019) lie in the work of Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) which may be regarded as a generalization of the famous result of Fine (1982) who established the conditions under which certain sets of marginal probabilities possess a joint probability distribution. A crucial assumption in Fine's work is that overlapping pairwise marginal probabilities are compatible with each other, a condition referred to as marginal selectivity, which in the present application reduces to a set of simple conditions of the form
in other words, the average values of all variables R j i are independent of context. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) essentially demonstrate how to extend Fine's result to embrace the case in which marginal selectivity fails.
This generalized Fine's theorem leads to a set of conditions (of which Eq. (2) is an example) which Dzhafarov and Kujala (2015) claim to be tests for contextuality in the presence of signalling. However, their derivation of these conditions involves two features of note. The first is that they define signalling as a failure of conditions such as Eq. (6), which is reasonable, but this does not fully characterise 'direct influence'. We would regard this definition of signalling as capturing the average degree of direct influence, since it concerns expectation values of observables. We would instead argue, inspired by examples from physics, that the presence of direct influence is more fully characterized by non-zero values of probabilities of the form p(R j i R k i ) (i.e, the probabilities that the same variable measured in different contexts gives different results). Indeed this possibility occurs in our model above where direct influence is present trial to trial but averages to zero. (We note however that this stronger notion of influence may not be readily detectable without more elaborate measurements, a key qualitative difference to the weaker notion based on Eq.(6) which involves measurable quantities.)
The second feature is that, as indicated earlier, they employ a definition of non-contextuality more restricted than ours, in which the underlying joint probability is required to change as little as possible across different contexts (meaning that probabilities of the form p(R j i R k i ) are minimized). This requirement in fact implies that the more complete characterisation of direct influence stated above coincides with signalling, which is why the distinction between different notions of influence is not apparent in their work.
We thus see that the claims of Dzhafarov & Kujala (2015) about the presence of contextuality beyond that explainable by direct influence hinge on notions of signalling and of contextuality which are both weaker than those commonly used in physics and psychology. By contrast the stronger notions described in this paper permit the construction of a non-contextual model.
To put this another way, in order to claim contextuality, it is necessary to show that there is no other possible account of the correlations. In physics it is necessary to go to some lengths to be sure of this. The attitude one needs to adopt is of the 'worst case scenario', where the direct influence is as hard to detect as possible. Only by ruling out this sort of stubborn direct influence can we be sure that a non-contextual account is impossible. In contrast, focussing on changes to the marginal distributions can be thought of as a 'best case scenario', where the direct influence is as easy to detect as possible. Ruling out changes to the average distributions is necessary, but not sufficient to rule out direct influences, because one could imagine, for example, that the process of measuring A changes the correlation between A and B, but not the averages. This clearly implies a direct influence between A and B, but one which is not detectable from the marginals alone.
For this reason we are not convinced the modified Bell/LG inequalities proposed by Dzhafarov & Kujala (2015) suffice to rule out all possible non-contextual accounts. However it might be the case that their analysis can be adapted, by including reference to higher order signalling correlations for example, in a way that would rule out the models we propose above. We are currently working on such an analysis.
Discussion
The above results raise an interesting question; is it ever possible to rule out direct influences in a psychology setting?
This remains an open question, but we suspect the answer is negative. In physics one can always reproduce the results of quantum theory with a model which is non-contextual but non-local (Bohm, 1952) . In physics such accounts can be ruled out on the basis of a physical principle, locality, but this is an additional assumption going beyond statements about the statistics of measurements. There is nothing equivalent in psychology that would supply such a clear cut limit on the set of allowable models.
Does this mean contextual inequalities have nothing to teach us in psychology? Not necessarily. It has previously been argued (Yearsley & Pothos, 2014 ) that data satisfying Dzhafarov and Kujala's (2015) inequalities presents us with a choice -either we can construct a model which is non-contextual but which involves unobservable direct influences, or we can construct a model which only involves observed quantities, but which combines them in a contextual way. The correct way to proceed is not fixed by any mathematical law, but depends on the goals of the researcher.
